

Message Text

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ORIGIN ACDA-10

INFO OCT-01 EUR-12 EA-07 IO-13 ISO-00 NSC-05 PM-04
DODE-00 ERDA-05 SS-15 SIG-01 AF-10 ARA-10 CIAE-00
H-01 INR-07 L-03 NASA-01 NEA-10 NSAE-00 OIC-02
SP-02 PA-01 PRS-01 OES-07 NSCE-00 SSO-00 USIE-00
INRE-00 /128 R

DRAFTED BY CDA/MA/IR:BMURRAY
APPROVED BY CDA/MA:TDAVIES
NSC:JMARCUM
PM/DCA:HPHELPS
EUR/SOV:JGLASSMAN
IO/UNP:DMACUK
OSD/ISA:GHARLOW
ERDA:RDUFF
EUR/RPM:AKORKY
ACDA/GC:MMAZEAU
ACDA/WEC/ATE:EFINEGOLD(INFO)
ACDA/WEC/DI:WSTAPLES(INFO)
ACDA/MA/IR:TBARTHELEMY
S/S:JETHYDEN

-----034314 020242Z /72

O R 020153Z JUL 77
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO USMISSION GENEVA IMMEDIATE
INFO AMEMBASSY BONN
AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE
AMEMBASSY VIENNA
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
USMISSION NATO
AMEMBASSY OTTAWA
AMEMBASSY ROME
AMEMBASSY TOKYO
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK

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C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 154465

VIENNA ALSO PASS USIAEA

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PARM, CCD

SUBJECT CCD 1977 SUMMER SESSION: GUIDANCE FOR US DELEGATION - CTB SECTION

1. FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF SECTION ON COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAND (CTB) FOR INCLUSION IN GUIDANCE FOR 1977 CCD SUMMER SESSION.

BEGIN TEXT. COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN (CTB). PURSUANT TO A DECISION REACHED AT THE MOSCOW MEETINGS BETWEEN SECRETARY VANCE AND FOREIGN MINISTER GROMYKO IN MARCH, THE US AND USSR CARRIED OUT FOUR DAYS (JUNE 13-16) OF EXPLORATORY DISCUSSIONS ON THE QUESTION OF A CTB. ON THE BASIS OF HIGH-LEVEL CONTACTS AMONG THE US, UK, AND USSR PRIOR TO THE BILATERALS, IT WAS AGREED THAT, AFTER THOSE EXPLORATORY TALKS, CTB DISCUSSIONS WOULD CONTINUE ON A TRILATERAL BASIS. SOON AFTER THE CONCLUSION OF THE BILATERALS, IT WAS PUBLICLY ANNOUNCED THAT TRILATERAL DISCUSSIONS WOULD BEGIN IN GENEVA ON JULY 13. IN VIEW OF THE FORTHCOMING STATEMENTS BY PRESIDENT CARTER IN RECENT MONTHS, AS WELL AS THE PUBLIC ANNOUNCEMENT ABOUT THE TRILATERAL TALKS, THE CTB ISSUE WILL UNDOUBTEDLY BE THE FOCUS OF CONSIDERABLE ATTENTION DURING THE CCD SUMMER SESSION. A NUMBER OF DELEGATIONS WILL PROBABLY HAVE UNREALISTICALLY HIGH EXPECTATIONS THAT DETAILED MULTILATERAL CTB NEGOTIATIONS WILL BEGIN THIS SUMMER,

AND THEY CAN BE EXPECTED TO PRESS FOR INFORMATION ABOUT
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THE TRILATERALS AND FOR AN EARLY TRANSFER OF THE NEGOTIATIONS TO THE CCD.

OUR OVERALL OBJECTIVES ON THE CTB ISSUE WILL BE TO CONVEY TO OTHER CCD MEMBERS THE UNITED STATES DETERMINATION TO SEEK A MULTILATERAL TREATY TO BAN NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS, TO ALLEVIATE ANY CONCERNS THAT MAY EXIST THAT NON-NUCLEAR WEAPON STATES ARE NOT BEING GIVEN AN ADEQUATE ROLE IN THE NEGOTIATIONS, AND TO PROMOTE US VIEWS ON THE KEY ELEMENTS OF A CTB TREATY TO THE EXTENT THIS CAN BE DONE WITHOUT GETTING INTO A PUBLIC CONFRONTATION WITH THE SOVIETS THAT MIGHT TEND TO JEOPARDIZE PROSPECTS FOR THE TRILATERALS.

THE LAST OBJECTIVE WILL REQUIRE THAT US VIEWS ON CERTAIN ISSUES NOT BE TREATED IN GREAT DETAIL IN US PLENARY STATEMENTS DURING THE SESSION (AT A MINIMUM IN THE OPENING SPEECH AND PERHAPS AT THE TIME OF THE INFORMAL MEETINGS ON CTB TENTATIVELY SCHEDULED FOR JULY 18-22), AND IN LIGHT OF THE NEED TO COORDINATE OUR EFFORTS IN THE CCD AND IN THE TRILATERALS, IT WILL BE IMPORTANT THAT THOSE STATEMENTS BE CLEARED IN WASHINGTON.

THE CTB ISSUE WILL INEVITABLY BE AN IMPORTANT TOPIC OF INFORMAL DISCUSSIONS DURING THE SESSION. OTHER DELEGATIONS CAN BE EXPECTED TO ASSERT THEIR OWN VIEWS DURING SUCH PRIVATE EXCHANGES AND TO PRESS FOR OURS. WE WISH TO AVOID ANY ACTIONS IN THE CCD WHICH COULD GIVE THE SOVIETS THE IMPRESSION THAT WE ARE PRIVATELY LOBBYING FOR WIDE SUPPORT ON ISSUES THAT ARE BILATERALLY CONTENTIOUS (LARGELY TO AVOID A POTENTIALLY DAMAGING SOVIET COUNTER-CAMPAIGN, ESPECIALLY ON VERIFICATION AND PNES). CONSEQUENTLY, IN RESPONDING TO THE INTEREST OF OTHER CCD MEMBERS IN DISCUSSING CTB ISSUES INFORMALLY, THE DELEGATION SHOULD USE EXTREME CARE NOT TO DISCUSS PROBLEMS WHICH ARE AT ISSUE IN THE TRILATERAL NEGOTIATIONS BUT MAY DRAW ON THE FOLLOWING POINTS CONCERNING PROCEDURAL AND POLITICAL AS-
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PECTS OF THESE NEGOTIATIONS:

A. WE BELIEVE THAT, TO ACHIEVE THE WIDEST POSSIBLE ADHERENCE, A CTB TREATY SHOULD BE THE PRODUCT OF TRULY MULTILATERAL NEGOTIATIONS. WE THEREFORE PLAN TO EMPHASIZE THE ROLE OF THE CCD IN DEVELOPING A BROADLY ACCEPTABLE TEXT.

B. WE ARE CONCERNED, HOWEVER, THAT IF WE PROCEEDED IMMEDIATELY TO THE CCD, EXISTING DIFFERENCES OF VIEW AMONG THE NUCLEAR WEAPON STATES MIGHT ONLY TEND TO HARDEN, AND WE MIGHT FIND OURSELVES IN A LENGTHY PERIOD OF PUBLIC POSTURING. WE FEEL IT IS DESIRABLE, THEREFORE, FOR THE

STATES THAT HAVE BEEN ASKED BY THE UNGA TO BEAR THE PRINCIPAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR PURSUING A CTB (I.E., THE LTBT AND NPT DEPOSITORY GOVERNMENTS) TO TAKE THE LEAD IN SEEKING TO BREAK THE LONG-STANDING CTB IMPASSE.

C. WE BELIEVE THAT THE TRILATERAL DISCUSSIONS SHOULD BE AIMED AT REACHING AGREEMENT ON THE KEY ELEMENTS OF A CTB TREATY. ONCE SUCH AGREEMENT IS ACHIEVED, IT IS OUR HOPE THAT A JOINT STATEMENT OF KEY ELEMENTS COULD BE TABLED AT THE CCD AS A PROPOSED BASIS FOR ELABORATION OF A CTB TREATY TEXT. IT IS OUR HOPE THAT THE TRILATERAL TALKS WILL HAVE THE EFFECT OF EXPEDITING A SUCCESSFUL CONCLUSION OF THE NEGOTIATIONS.

D. WE BELIEVE THAT A CTB SHOULD BE EMBODIED IN A MULTILATERAL TREATY COVERING ALL ENVIRONMENTS. IT SHOULD NOT, HOWEVER, AFFECT EXISTING LTBT OBLIGATIONS.

E. WHILE OUR OBJECTIVE IS THE EVENTUAL PARTICIPATION OF ALL NUCLEAR POWERS IN A CTB, WE DO NOT BELIEVE A CTB TREATY
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SHOULD REQUIRE ADHERENCE BY ALL OF THEM FOR ENTRY INTO
FORCE.

F. WE ARE PREPARED TO ACCEPT A CTB TREATY THAT PROVIDES
FOR REVIEW AND THE OPTION TO WITHDRAW AFTER A SPECIFIED
LENGTH OF TIME.

RE PNES AND VERIFICATION, IF PRESSED, DELEGATION MAY INDI-
CATE THAT THESE ISSUES ARE CURRENTLY UNDER NEGOTIATION AND
THAT DEL DOES NOT WISH AT THIS TIME TO DISCUSS THEM IN
THIS FORUM. DELEGATION MAY SAY, HOWEVER, THAT THE US WOULD
OF COURSE NOT ENTER INTO ANY AGREEMENT WHICH IT FELT COULD
NOT BE ADEQUATELY VERIFIED.

ADDITIONAL GUIDANCE WILL BE PROVIDED AS APPROPRIATE. END
TEXT. CHRISTOPHER

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Message Attributes

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Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Sent Date: 02-Jul-1977 12:00:00 am
Decaption Date: 01-Jan-1960 12:00:00 am
Decaption Note:
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 22 May 2009
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Disposition History: n/a
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